

The International Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Anti-Marcos Movements¹

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This paper aims to make sense of the relationship between the transnational nonstate actor, International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) and the Philippine revolution of 1986 (EDSA 1986). Through an investigation of the events that took place prior to the revolution, it claims that IFOR helped shape the outcome of EDSA 1986 through its assistance in the mobilization of the nonviolent anti-Marcos movement in the years prior to the February 1986 revolution. First, at the structural level, following the death of Ninoy Aquino, the favorable conditions both in the domestic and international political opportunity structures allowed the anti-Marcos movements to work hand in hand with the IFOR operatives. Second, at the agentic level, the series of fora, seminars, and workshops on active nonviolence organized by IFOR from 1984 to the weeks leading to the revolution had facilitated the diffusion of the principle and methods of active nonviolence to the anti-Marcos movements. Through frame alignment, the mobilization of anti-Marcos movements became possible during the critical moments of the revolution. This mobilization facilitated the further opening of the domestic political opportunity structures (opening of the political access in the Marcos regime after the snap elections, realignment of the anti-Marcos elites, participation of influential allies, low level of political repression, and opening of the media access) during the days leading to EDSA 1986.

Keywords: social movements; political opportunity structures; international political opportunity structures; domestic political opportunity structures; social movement repertoires; frames; frame alignment; active nonviolence; revolution.

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Stephen Zunes wrote a seminal article on the 1986 People Power Revolution (EDSA 1986). In an attempt to spell out the roots of the nonviolent revolution in the Philippines, Zunes (1999) discussed the involvement of a transnational nonstate actor, International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) to the revolutionary process of EDSA 1986. The article claimed that the nonviolent revolution is by far a product of an organized mobilization of nonviolent anti-Marcos movements brought by the conjunction of these two sources (Zunes 1999). On the one hand, the mobilization of the anti-Marcos forces, which are composed of the radical, moderate and reformist groups, had laid down the necessary conditions in undermining the praetorian state of the former dictator, Ferdinand Marcos (Marcos). In the aftermath of the assassination Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. (Ninoy) on 23 August 1983, the use of armed struggle by the radical movements and nonviolent protest actions of the moderate and reformist groups had kept the Marcos government preoccupied in all fronts. On the other hand, the arrival of the IFOR operatives in 1984, represented by the couple, Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr assisted the anti-Marcos struggle through the introduction of the principle and methods of active nonviolence to the moderate and reformist anti-Marcos forces (Zunes 1999). The series of workshops, fora and seminars organized by IFOR from 1984 to 1986, it further argued, had been helpful in transmitting and reproducing the needed ideational resources that facilitated the mobilization of the nonviolent anti-Marcos forces and the people at large during the critical moments of the political crisis in February 1986 (Zunes 1999).

For the current scholarship on EDSA 1986, the findings of Zunes may be a good source to stimulate the resurgence of the theoretical vibrancy that once dominated the literature. The narratives that convey the genesis of nonviolent social movements in EDSA 1986 perfectly capture the link between anti-Marcos movements and the nonviolent outcome of the revolution. They speak of the introduction and usage of active nonviolence as a principle and method of political action in EDSA 1986. In particular, they specifically tell us of the actual interaction and negotiation that took place between the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements and IFOR on the concept, repertoire and practice of active nonviolence. However, while the recent discovery serves as a boon for EDSA 1986 scholarship as whole, a bigger question now confronts the scholars and historians – where should the scholarship proceed from these recent discoveries on EDSA 1986?

This paper attempts to take the lead in engaging the scholarship to a more comprehensive and theoretically informed understanding of the events in EDSA 1986. Inadvertently, I identified three important pitfalls that prompted me to write this paper. First, the article failed to explain the interaction or the link that was established between IFOR and anti-Marcos movements. Second, Zunes also fell short in elucidating how the anti-Marcos movements actually appropriated the principle and method of active nonviolence. Lastly, the work did not provide clearly explicate the impact of IFOR to the outcome of EDSA 1986. With these problems, I aim to address the following research questions: Given the repressive tendencies of the Marcos government, how did the IFOR and anti-Marcos movements managed to network with each other? While they already agreed to be nonviolent, why did the anti-Marcos movements still appropriated the principles and method of active nonviolence of IFOR? Despite the immanency of the downfall of Marcos after the snap election, how did IFOR contribute to the nonviolent change of regime on 25 February 1986?

Using the recent theories of social movement, I argue that in a relatively open political opportunity structure, transnational nonstate actors may increase the likelihood of success in a revolution through its ideational influence and support for the networking capabilities of revolutionary movements. Moreover, I explain the accounts on the origins of EDSA 1986 by specifically claiming that the opening in the Marcos regime in the 1980s allowed IFOR to increase the likelihood of a successful revolution in EDSA 1986 through its influence in the choice of strategy (repertoires) and alignment of interpretative orientations (framings) among the anti-Marcos movements.

THE ROOTS OF THE REVOLUTION

The rift in the relationship between the Marcos government and the elites came from three different sources from 1969 to 1986. From 1969-1971, the Philippines experienced the economic crisis of the late 1960s to early 1970s (Daroy 1988). This economic crisis was coupled with the political crisis brought by the nationalist fervor of the late 1960s and 'First Quarter Storm' of the early 1970s (Daroy 1988). As a response to these crises, some intellectual elites from the nationalist movements went underground and allied themselves with the armed group of the old Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). However, despite the rise of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) and other national democratic movements that came as an offshoot of the split-up in the PKP, the larger

population remained submissive in the regime. The proliferation of mass actions headed by the emerging national democrat movements did not mobilize the larger populace against Marcos. Also, the traditional politicians' relationship with the regime was colored by the traditional political relation between the incumbent and opposition. The elections of 1971, for instance, saw the participation of the traditional political elites in the electoral process under the Marcos presidency (Thompson 1995).

During the period of 1972-1982, the Philippines also experienced an economic downturn beginning in the late 1970s. Aside from that, the repressiveness of the regime (mass arrests, tortures, etc.) caused serious political crisis in society. As a response to these crises, the traditional opposition politicians, social democrats, some business elites, some clergymen went underground and finally became parallel revolutionary movements (e.g. the social democrat-led Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas [PDSAP], Light a Fire Movement [LAFM] and April Six Liberation Movement [ASLM]) to the CPP-NPA and other national democratic movements (Thompson 1995; Tiglao 1988). However, just like the previous period, the emergence of these groups and their eventual participation in the revolutionary struggle that was started in the first period did not mobilize the popular movements and the larger majority of people at that time. Due to the repressive policies and militarization of the regime, the eventual growth of anti-Marcos movements (national democrats, social democrats and other traditional political elites) lagged behind in tapping the larger public in their efforts to reform the political system or oust the dictator. During this period, only a number of successful mass actions against the regime were organized and participated by the nonaligned general public. Among these major mass actions were the 'Alay-Lakad of 1974' of Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO) and the noise barrage of 6 April 1978 which gave birth to emerging new revolutionary ethos of the evolving anti-Marcos movements (Olague 2005; R. Intengan & F. Gonzales, personal communication, 21 February 2009; Thompson 1995; Tiglao 1988).

In 1983-1986, the economic crisis of the early 1980s aggravated by the brutal assassination of Ninoy and the fraudulent snap elections facilitated the slow yet steady unification of the elite and the popular movements. After the death of Ninoy in 1983, most people and the large segment of the business elites responded positively to the mobilization during the funeral of Aquino and the numerous demonstrations, protests and mass actions against Marcos that followed. In these mass actions, cause-oriented groups emerged to

reinforce the earlier efforts of the anti-Marcos movements that time. The Catholic Church also became increasingly critical of the regime and was very influential in supporting the anti-Marcos movements. During this period, most of the business class, the Catholic Church, and some people in the military eventually worked hand in hand or in parallel with the national democrats, social democrats, traditional opposition politicians, and some business elites in cutting their ties with the Marcos regime.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS IN THE EMERGENCE OF NONVIOLENT ANTI-MARCOS MOVEMENTS

More importantly, the period 1983-1986 also saw the interaction between the domestic and international social movements. The burgeoning anti-Marcos demonstrations and various anti-Marcos movements (elite/popular groups) opened up domestic political opportunity structures in the Marcos regime. They provided opportunities for domestic movements to internationalize their struggle. To reinforce the growing revolutionary struggle against Marcos, anti-Marcos movements together with some Church people sought the help of IFOR in spreading the nonviolent option among its ranks.

IFOR is a nonprofit, nonstate and voluntary entity that operates beyond the Westphalian territoriality to address the failure of states in maintaining peace and rejecting the use of violence across the world. As a transnational nonstate actor, IFOR emerged as a transnational pacifist advocacy group that acted through a network of pacifist activists to promote the philosophy and methods of active nonviolence. Since 1919, it had rapidly increased its membership, activities, and coverage of their operation in many countries across the world (Ferguson 1984; Deats 2001). With its goal of promoting peace and nonviolence, IFOR had maintained a network of peace activists from various places. Since its inception in 1919, it has never ceased in campaigning for the end to violent conflict in various parts of world (Ferguson 1984; Deats 2001). Lastly, IFOR's campaigns were usually directed against the failure of the globalizing state and market institutions in maintaining peace and ending the use of violence. The proliferation of violence and threat of war across the globe really contributed to its popularity since 1919.

Before I go to the discussion about its participation in EDSA 1986, I will now attempt to make sense of the dynamics between the international and domestic realms of activism after the death of Aquino. Drawing on the ideas of Sikkink (2005), the effort to internationalize the domestic anti-Marcos struggle may be understood through the dynamics between the domestic

and international political opportunity structures. According to Sikkink (2005), the concept of political opportunity structures, both at the domestic and the international levels, means the ‘access to institutions, or how open or closed domestic and international institutions are to network or social movement pressures and participation’ (Sikkink 2005: 155). Looking at Table 1, the relationship between the two political opportunity structures can be understood in four models which are structured into two realms. For the domestic realm, political opportunity structures refer to the level of openness or closedness of the domestic political institutions to various domestic social movement influences (Sikkink 2005). The international opportunity structures, on the other hand, pertain to the degree of openness or closedness of the international institutions to the participation of transnational social movements (Sikkink 2005).

Table 1: The Interactive Model in the Domestic-International Structures Dynamic Multilevel Governance (Sikkink 2005: 156)

Domestic Opportunity Structure	International Opportunity Structure	
	Closed	Open
Closed	A. Diminished Chances of Activism	B. Boomerang pattern and Spiral model
Open	C. Democratic Deficit/ Defensive Transnationalization	D. Insider/Outsider Coalition Model

In Model A – *Diminished Opportunities for Activism*, both the international and domestic opportunity structures are closed for activism at the international and domestic levels. In relation to the revolutionary process, this suggests that by any means, both actors will have a hard time forwarding or internationalizing their claims for change and thus have lesser chances of succeeding in their goal. Model B – *Boomerangs and Spirals*, on the other hand, speaks of an open space in the international opportunity structure for revolutionary movements. Despite the absence of opportunity at the domestic level, revolutionary movements may use the ‘boomerang pattern’ or ‘spiral model’ in strengthening activism; by boomerang pattern, I meant the effort of the domestic actors to internationalize their political claims in a repressive environment (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2005). On the other, the spiral model speaks of a more dynamic version of the boomerang effect which highlights the interaction between the international and domestic (Risse &

Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005). The third model, C – *Democratic Deficit/ Defensive Transnationalization*, depicts the opposite of the boomerang/spiral model. For this view, issues that sprang out because of discontent in the internationalization of their domestic lives lead activists to bring their claims and operate on their own at the international level. In revolutions, this situation does not speak of any help or contribution in the revolutionary process. The actions that were described here only depict the actions of domestic movements against international organizations or institutions. For the last model, D – *Activists within and beyond Borders: Insider/Outsider Coalitions* model, the situation is quite new. In an open domestic and international opportunity structures, the tendency for both domestic and international actors is to mix different modes of activism and according to Sikkink (2005), to favor domestic political change while keeping the international realm open for further action. In revolutions, this allows us to make sense of and understand the simultaneous actions of transnational nonstate actors and domestic movements in the revolutionary process.

Going back to EDSA 1986, the initial interaction between IFOR and the emerging nonviolent anti-Marcos movements can be initially explained through Boomerang pattern or the effort of the domestic actors to internationalize their political claims in a repressive environment and Spiral model or the Insider/outside coalition model or the dynamic version of the boomerang effect which highlights the interaction between the international and domestic movements (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Resse & Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005). During 1983-1986, the international political opportunity structures were very accessible to the domestic anti-Marcos movements. The repressive regime of Marcos did not extend to the suppression of the right to travel. In fact, since the 1970s, people like Raul Manglapus of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP) and the groups such as the International Association of Patriotic Filipinos (IAFF), Anti-Martial Law Coalition (ALC), National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP), Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP) and the Friends of the Filipino People (FFP) had used the international arena to criticize the Marcos regime across the US (Muego 1988). For the domestic political opportunity structures, the period saw the rapid transformation in the level of openness of the Marcos regime to social movement influence. The growth of movements and mass actions spurred by cause-oriented groups during those years had to a certain extent weakened the citadel of the military-backed regime. During the early transformation stage in the political opportunity structures under Marcos, the

anti-Marcos movements opted to use the Boomerang pattern and the Spiral model (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Resse & Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005) in establishing connections at the international level.

IFOR made its first contact with the anti-Marcos movements through a letter from a Sr. Marlen discussing the gloomy political situation in the Philippines at that time. IFOR representatives came to the Philippines in February 1983 to assess the situation and formally establish links with the anti-Marcos movements. From then on, IFOR answered the call of the anti-Marcos movements by organizing lectures/seminars/workshops on active nonviolence. Through IFOR representatives Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, the anti-Marcos movements learned first-hand the principles and the toolkit or method of nonviolence (Deats n.d., 2001; Goss-Mayr 1998).

During the months before the snap elections, the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements started to shift towards the insider/outsider coalition model or a situation where both the domestic and international contexts are open for activism or influence. In this situation, both transnational and domestic social movements tend to mix different modes of activism to favor the domestic political change while keeping the international realm open for further action (Sikkink 2005).

Marcos' decision to hold parliamentary elections in 1984 and snap elections in 1986 relatively opened the political opportunity structures in the Philippines. As will be explained later, the increasing political access in the domestic structures after the death of Aquino, allowed both the domestic anti-Marcos movements and IFOR to work side by side in engaging the Marcos regime. On the one hand, some anti-Marcos movements, Akasyon Para sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA), the Catholic Church and some business elites decided to participate in the 1984 and 1986 elections. On the other hand, IFOR and AKKAPKA continued its work in promoting the principles and methods of active nonviolence in various parts of the country. Thus, while working with National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), AKKAPKA and IFOR operatives Jean Goss, Hildegard Goss-Mayr, Stefan Merken, and Richard Deats simultaneously organized lectures/seminars/workshops on nonviolence throughout the country (Deats 2001).

At the domestic level, the mobilization of the various anti-Marcos movements during this period can be explained by the five core dimensions of political opportunity structures (Schock 1999). In the literature, political opportunities would mean as the 'consistent – but not necessary formal,

permanent or national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics’ (Tarrow 1998: 20). In explaining the domestic revolutionary movement mobilization in the structural sense, I made use of the five (5) core dimensions in the political opportunity approach used by Schock (1999) in his study on EDSA 1986: increasing political access, influential allies, divided elites, declining state repression and press freedom.

When I say increasing political access, it means the opening of spaces in the political institutions that enable movements to influence the functions of government. For the concept of influential allies, this pertains to the existence of social and political groupings extending support in the mobilizational, financial and leadership aspects of the movement organization and mobilization. As regards to the idea of divided elites, this underscores elite realignment and their eventual support for or participation in revolutionary struggle brought by the changing social, economic and political policies. Declining state repression relates to the state actions that impede collective actions or movement mobilization. Finally, press freedom pertains to the relatively free flow of information that facilitates or constrains revolutionary movement mobilization.

In an open political opportunity structure, social movements enjoy the opportunity to influence their lawmakers, government agencies and judicial bodies. To bolster this effort, they can easily seek help from other groups like political parties, nongovernmental organizations and other social movement organizations. This may also extend to certain elite groups that have the same goals and interests as theirs. Lastly, under this condition, these efforts are done freely yet relatively regulated by the state. On the other hand, in a closed political opportunity structure, social movements are faced with a highly centralized government with a propensity to thwart any mass actions. Their efforts are further undermined by the relative absence of potential allies from both other organizations and the elites. Finally, this attempt to introduce change in the society is not tolerated by the government.

As regards the increasing political access aspect, the years that came after the brutal assassination of Aquino saw the slow opening of Marcos regime to political activism of the anti-Marcos movements. The elections of 1984 and 1986 can be seen as an opportunity for anti-Marcos movements to gain representation in the government. By fielding candidates, the anti-Marcos movements exerted effort to get a share of the political pie under Marcos regime. On the part of Marcos, the opening of the electoral environment did

not affect his clout in the government. Being the incumbent president, Marcos and his allies obviously had an upper-hand over the opposition groups in influencing the outcome of the elections. During the 1984 and 1986 elections, Marcos and his allies used the huge resources of the regime to ensure the electoral victory of Marcos and his allies (Thompson 1995). However, despite this inequality in the electoral exercise, the emergence of NAMFREL came as a boon to the anti-Marcos movements' decision to participate in the parliamentary and presidential snap elections. In safeguarding the electoral process (during the campaign, casting of votes, counting and proclamation), NAMFREL indirectly supported the anti-Marcos electoral efforts in gaining seats in the government. In fact, the participation of NAMFREL helped Corazon Aquino and her allies to claim the presidency against Marcos (Hedman 2006).

In the aspect of *influential allies*, the period also saw the participation of the military, Catholic Church and some groups in the US government (Diokno 1988). These groups extended moral, organizational or diplomatic support to the anti-Marcos movements' struggle. The rise of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and the eventual withdrawal of support by some disgruntled military officers during the February uprising further undermined the military-backed regime of Marcos. On the part of the Catholic Church, the series of Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) pastoral letters and then Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin's homilies and statements that criticized the regime motivated the conservative sector as well as independents to participate in the struggle (Ofreneo 1987). Various groups, especially in the business sector, were motivated by the critical stand of the Catholic Church against Marcos. For the US government, the statements of some senators and administrative officials against Marcos diminished his political legitimacy here and abroad. To support the opening and safeguarding of the electoral process in the Philippines, NAMFREL as well as other movements received financial and tactical support from some US politicians and agencies (Thompson 1995).

With regard to *elite realignment*, the years after the death of Aquino saw the rapid transformation in the movement of elite groups towards the anti-Marcos movements. After the assassination and eventual decision of the Catholic Church to openly denounce the regime, numerous elite groups began to support the growing anti-Marcos movements (Diokno 1988). The Makati Business Club (MBC), Philippine Chamber of Commerce, Inc. (PCCI), Bishops-Businessmen's Conference (BBC) to name a few, aligned themselves with some traditional opposition politicians, elite martial law victims, and the

Catholic Church in criticizing the Marcos regime. Like the influential allies, the business elites were very supportive of the mobilization of the larger populace against Marcos. Many business elites in Makati allowed the area to be used for anti-Marcos demonstrations, protests and other mass actions rallies over which initially took the form of indignation rallies over the killing of Aquino (Diokno 1988). Also, the business elites in Tondo and Makati were significant in providing financial support to anti-Marcos movements in their mass actions (Diokno 1988; Burton 1989; Thompson 1995). In addition, many business elites even became involved in some major mobilization efforts by the anti-Marcos movements (Diokno 1988). The reemergence of NAMFREL, for one, had shown how the business elites from MBC as well other business groups became significant in ensuring the clean and orderly exercise of elections (Diokno 1988). In the snap elections, NAMFREL mobilized a wide network of priests, nuns and community organizers to ensure a clean and orderly election. By exposing the massive electoral fraud and violence, NAMFREL motivated the anti-Marcos movements to denounce the proclamation of Marcos after the elections.

The developments that unfolded after the death of Ninoy had only intensified the mobilization of anti-Marcos movements already in place at that time indicating the *decline of state repression*. Contrary to most social movement scholars, the repression by the Marcos state that started in early 1970s actually became the impetus for the growth of anti-Marcos movements. Because of political repression, killings, salvaging, torture, and disappearances during the Martial Law regime, Marcos' popularity rapidly dwindled. The propensity of the regime to use repression and violence actually facilitated the emergence of movements against the regime (Wurfel 1998). Instead of cowering before the Marcos regime, the period of 1972-1982 saw the emerging movements going underground and operating abroad (Tiglao 1988; Muego 1988; R. Intengan, & F. Gonzales, personal communication, 21 February 2009). The foundation of the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (KDSP) in 1971 and the eventual rise of PDSP in 1973 were the results of the clandestine underground mobilization of social democratic movements that time (Tiglao 1988; R. Intengan & F. Gonzales, personal communication, 21 February, 2009). On the other hand, the traditional political elites who were forced to go on exile abroad established numerous movements in the US and other parts of the world. The emergence of MFP, Anti-Martial Law Coalition, to name a few was rooted in the political harassments, intimidations, threats caused by the repressive government of

Marcos (Muego 1988). For the older movements, the CPP-NPA managed to receive support from the people during the period of 1970s-1980s. During this period, the national democrat revolutionary movement grew bigger and expanded their operations from various parts of the country (Rocamora 1994). From 1973 to 1977, the communist insurgents managed to establish nine self-reliant regional committees (Tiglao 1988). In 1983-1986, these movements were reinvigorated and went aboveground to participate and even organize numerous anti-Marcos mass actions.

With regards to *press freedom*, the years that came after the death of Ninoy Aquino capped the slow growth of an independent media sector in the Philippines. Since 1977, *Malaya* (1977) and the *Pahayagang Malaya* (1982) by Jose Burgos as well as *Mr. & Ms.* provided alternative information to emerging critical mass against Marcos that time (Gonzales 1988). In the aftermath of the Aquino assassination, the 'alternative' media emerged to provide information and analysis that were absent from the Marcos-controlled press. Together with the print media, the Catholic Church revised the programming of *Radio Veritas* to broadcast live the investigation hearings and analysis on the death of Aquino (Gonzales 1988). The proliferation of the mosquito press and Veritas enabled the people to receive valuable information related to the death of Ninoy Aquino and the needed facts to amplify their claims and contentions against Marcos. During the uprising, the Church-sponsored *Radio Veritas* became the lone voice of anti-Marcos movement. It was through this form of media that people got to know what was happening during the four-day revolution. Through the guidance of June Keithley, the people were mobilized immediately to various sides of Camps Crame and Aguinaldo. The information and details that were broadcasted kept millions of people abreast with the developments on the opposing sides. In fact, the siege of Channels 7 and 4 clearly showed the vital role of media during that historic event to both parties (Brisbin 1988).

AGENTIC FACTORS IN THE MOBILIZATION OF NONVIOLENT ANTI-MARCOS MOVEMENTS

Going back to our discussion on the link between IFOR and EDSA, the mobilization of anti-Marcos movements through the domestic political opportunity structures was influenced by IFOR's diffusion of the nonviolent repertoires and the framings of active nonviolence. In the years 1984-1986, IFOR organized numerous lectures/seminars on nonviolence for various people coming from the clergy, politicians, organizers, civic leaders,

professionals, activists, academics, students and common folks (Goss-Mayer 1998; Zunes 1999; Deats 2001). In these lectures/seminars/workshops, IFOR laid down the foundation for the emergence of the local nonviolence movement called AKKAPKA in 1984. As discussed earlier, both IFOR and AKKAPKA worked to propagate active nonviolence in the Philippines. Through the efforts of IFOR and AKKAPKA, various people from different sectors and political groups were introduced to the principles and practical uses of active nonviolence. Also, as stated earlier, during the snap election, AKKAPKA became significant in supporting the nonviolent confrontation between a major portion of anti-Marcos movements, and Marcos through electoral exercise. Through their support for the effort of ensuring a clean and honest election, anti-Marcos movements were motivated to engage Marcos through an electoral showdown. Throughout the four-day uprising in EDSA, numerous nonviolent actors who attended the lectures of both IFOR and AKKAPKA put into effect the teachings of nonviolence in the midst of the growing tension between loyalist soldiers and rebel military men.

At the agentic level, IFOR was highly responsible for diffusing the methods of active nonviolence to the domestic anti-Marcos movements. Using the concept of *interactive transnational diffusion* (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002), the repertoire of active nonviolence in EDSA 1986 came out as an offshoot of an interactive (centripetal and centrifugal) and deliberate transmission of ideas, experiences, skills and methods of active nonviolence through a series of lectures/seminars/workshops attended by the clergy, politicians, community organizers, civic leaders, professionals, activists, academics, students and common folk from 1984 to 1986.

The process of transnational diffusion of repertoires stems from the response of social movement organizations to the 'protest cycle' or the existence or creation of conflict, broad sectoral and geographical extension, new and old SMOs, new 'master frames' of meaning and the 'invention of new forms of collection action' (Tarrow 1995). This response can be categorized according to groups engaged in the protest cycle – *spin-off* and *initiator* (McAdam 1995). The latter refers to the social movements that set off an identifiable protest cycle while the former speaks of the social movements that get their impetus from the initiators (McAdam, 1995). The process of transnational diffusion speaks of the initiator movements that transmit the items of contention or ideas, skills and meanings to spin-off movements. In this case, McAdam (1995) further notes that initiator movements usually come from open political opportunity environments while spin-off movements emerge from closed and repressive governments.

As a reaction to the western-centric view of the earlier scholars, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) devised an interactive model of transnational diffusion by explaining the specific responses from both the initiator and spin-off movements. Instead of subscribing to the linear transmission of objects of contention (from west to east), the interactive model introduced a more discursive approach in understanding the transnational diffusion. To understand this conceptual innovation, the specific responses of initiator and spin-off movements present in the interactive transnational diffusions of repertoires are sorted as follows:

1. Hyper-difference and over-likeness or the critical appraisal of the repertoires
2. Dislocation and relocation or the meticulous consideration of its applicability
3. Brokerage and collective appropriation or the actual negotiation before implementation.

Hyper-difference and over-likeness stage refers to the attempt to link the initiators' or producers' interpretative constructions to that of the receivers' perceptions. Receivers assess whether (over-likeness) or not (hyper-difference) the items (e.g. ideas, information or skills) that are being transmitted are applicable to their context. The *dislocation and relocation* stage enables the receivers to weigh down the pros and cons of adapting the items that they received from the initiators or transnational nonstate actors. Receivers in this stage may perceive the applicability of the item (dislocation) or produce innovative means to make them applicable (relocation) to their context. Finally, *brokerage and collective appropriation* denotes the output of the transmission process. Revolutionary movements, in this stage, may establish new or strengthen the links with the initiators or transnational nonstate actors (brokerage) or may alter and devise new ways of making the items they received from the initiators applicable (collective appropriation).

Transnational diffusion of nonviolence entailed the existence of a 'protest cycle' or the emergence of ideas and methods of active nonviolence that were crafted or created from various experiences of protest actions in the past (Tarrow 1995). In transmitting the items of contentions (contents of protest cycle), the anti-Marcos movements may be seen as *spin-off* movements or movements that were mobilized because of IFOR's diffusion of active nonviolence. On the other hand, IFOR being the transnational nonstate actor qualifies as the initiator because of its ability to accumulate and diffuse various items of past protest cycles or ideas and methods of active nonviolence across

the world. Through the relative opening of the political opportunity structures (increasing political access, influential allies, elite realignment, decreasing repression and press freedom) during the early 1980s, IFOR got the chance to participate in the domestic revolutionary struggle against Marcos.

In EDSA 1986, the interactive or nonlinear transmission of active nonviolence between IFOR and anti-Marcos movements passed through three vital junctures from 1984 to 1986. Hyper-difference and over-likeness or the attempts to link IFOR's interpretative constructions on active nonviolence to anti-Marcos movements were seen in the series of lectures/seminars/workshops on active nonviolence from 1984 to 1986. In every meeting, the attendees were asked to reflect on and situate themselves in the struggle against Marcos (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). The role-playing sessions and the teachings on truth and love, among other things, helped them find their nonviolent nature as human beings (IFOR 'Active Nonviolence'; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). The systematic transmission of the concepts of active nonviolence through the reflection of the self to the source of injustice transmitted to attendees the message of the universality of nonviolence in all human actions. Through this recognition, the attendees had seen the over-likeness of active nonviolence and the Philippine context within the concept of the human person.

The dislocation and relocation stage which involved consideration of its applicability in the struggle against Marcos also took place during the series of lectures/seminars/workshops of the IFOR operatives. In the lectures, apart from the philosophical backdrop of nonviolence, IFOR representatives also presented the different stages of active nonviolence:

- 1.) Preparation – analysis of the conflict, preparation of groups, and development of strategy;
- 2.) Methods – Dialogue (negotiation), direct action, noncooperation and civil disobedience, fasting and hunger strikes and a constructive program (IFOR 'Methods of Non-Violent Action').

Because of the concern about the applicability of active nonviolence methods in the Philippine case, Goss-Mayr (1998) and her husband then shared their stories and experiences from Latin America and other stories of peace advocates around the world. In these stories, the couple stressed the different obstacles, hardships, and successes of various active nonviolent movements around the world. These anecdotes and success stories of active

nonviolence moved and inspired the attendees (Deats n.d., 2001; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

Finally, brokerage and collective appropriation speaks of the actual experience of active nonviolence from the IFOR lectures/seminars/workshops that produced a domestic pacifist/peace movement in 1984 (Deats n.d., 2008; Schwenk 1986; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009; T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009). The formation of AKKAPKA, established a new link and strengthened the existing relations between the anti-Marcos movements and IFOR (brokerage). Through their collaborative relationship, active nonviolence was made widely known to the public. However, despite its IFOR lineage, AKKAPKA chose to refine some aspects of active nonviolence in the Philippines (collective appropriation). As explained earlier, AKKAPKA added new concepts to the extant instructional materials they got from the visiting IFOR operatives. First, they introduced 'active nonviolence' as the 'third way' between violence and apathy. Active nonviolence was presented as the 'active, creative total respect for human life' response of the people towards violence. Second, the six 'Ps' (proclaim the truth, protest the injustice, penetrate the conscience of the adversary, part from injustice, persevere, and pay the price) were devised to augment the conceptual appeal of active nonviolence. Active nonviolence was presented to the larger majority as a coherent system of ideas that accentuates some the societal values in the Philippines. Lastly and more importantly, active nonviolence was used by AKKAPKA against the growing popularity of the armed struggle by the national democrats (i.e. CPP-NPA) (T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009).

Also at the agentic level, IFOR helped link together various interpretative orientations of different people in the anti-Marcos movements. Looking back at the those numerous lectures/seminars/workshops of IFOR and AKKAPKA on active violence, Jean Goss, Hildegard Goss Mayr, Fr. Blanco and other AKKAPKA workers acted as signifying agents that actively generated or produced a collective action frame or set of meanings and interpretation that eventually became motivated potential nonviolent actors to participate and support the anti-Marcos movements in EDSA 1986. In the creation of the master frame, the lectures/seminars/workshops generated the 'diagnostic framing' or the identification and attribution of the source of problem (Snow & Benford 1988). Second, IFOR and AKKAPKA operatives identified the 'prognosis framing' or the proposed solution to the problem (Snow & Benford 1988). Lastly, the attendees learned the 'motivational framing' or the rationale

for engaging in collective action (Snow & Benford 1988). As recalled by an AKKAPKA alumnus, Raul Socrates Banzuela (personal communication, 27 January, 2009), the seminars/workshops were clear enough to articulate the principle, tool of analysis and methods of active nonviolence. Through a combination of success stories and theories, he added, the couple was able to engage the attendees on how to frame the political crisis in the Philippines and how the active nonviolence can be used as an alternative form of struggle against the former dictator (R. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

Also, using the concept of frame alignment processes, IFOR contributed to the growth of anti-Marcos movements in the following ways. First, IFOR contributed to the participation in and support for the anti-Marcos movements by potential social movement actors through frame bridging or “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986: 467). Through their lectures/seminars/workshops, IFOR helped create a mass base of potential nonviolent political actors. In this form of frame alignment, the anti-Marcos movements did not have a hard time tapping these groups for their activities or asking for their support. The AKKAPKA group of Soc Banzuela demonstrated this in EDSA 1986. After hearing the call of Jaime Cardinal Sin and Butz Aquino, Banzuela and his AKKAPKA friends all met in *Isetann* (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). Despite the absence of a formal organizational decision to join the people in EDSA, IFOR alumni and AKKAPKA members immediately participated in the mass gathering to protect the military rebels. Also during the days of the uprising, IFOR and AKKAPKA alumni and members were asked by Fr. Blanco to join the people in EDSA. As recalled by an AKKAPKA member “Fr. Blanco went to the TV station encouraging all those who had seminars on active nonviolence since June of 1984 until February 1986 and said, ‘You are the most prepared people. Go there!’” (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

The contribution of IFOR to the anti-Marcos movements is also seen through *frame amplification* or the effort to clarify and invigorate a particular interpretative frame (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). In the literature, this is understood as coming from – i.) value amplification and ii.) belief amplification. Regarding value amplification or “identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for

any number of reasons" IFOR's lectures/seminars/workshops on the philosophy of active nonviolence motivated the potential nonviolent actors to make the anti-Marcos movements as their avenue to demonstrate their nonviolent commitments (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986: 469). In Sister Rocca's case, her deep appreciation of the Church teachings on nonviolence was amplified by the IFOR's (through AKKAPKA) lectures on the principles and practical uses of nonviolence. This then led her to proceed to Camp Crame and speak with the soldiers during the four-day uprising (Deats n.d.). With regard to belief amplification or the effort to augment the articulation of people's conviction towards a particular issue, thing, etc., IFOR's lectures/seminars/workshops on the philosophy of active nonviolence influenced the potential nonviolent actors to participate in numerous demonstrations, protests and other mass actions against the Marcos regime (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). In the case of Teresita Baltazar, her learning experiences in the AKKAPKA lectures convinced her to participate in numerous nonviolent protest actions following the death of Ninoy Aquino (T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009). This initial participation eventually led to a deeper involvement in the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements (e.g. AMA) (T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009).

Third, IFOR also contributed to the anti-Marcos movements through frame extension work or the effort to encompass the extant value, belief, or frame interpretative systems that are already incidental to the goals and objectives of the social movement (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). Through their lectures/seminars/workshops many people became aware of the nonviolent option against Marcos. In the case of Rizalino Rivera, another alumnus of AKKAPKA and EDSA 1986 veteran, his participation in EDSA 1986 was partly due to his prior knowledge of a nonviolent option (R. Rivera, personal communication, 16 February 2009). Aside from the goal of ousting Marcos, the dominant nonviolent atmosphere that he felt during the four-day uprising made him stay with the nonviolent crowd in EDSA.

Lastly, IFOR contributed to the anti-Marcos movements through frame transformation or the effort to address the absence of frames that could be similar or congruent to the goals and objectives of the social movements (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). Through their attendance at IFOR lectures/seminars/workshops, many people got a glimpse of the philosophy and practical use of active nonviolence. According to Banzuela, his experience with Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr was for him '*life-*

changing' (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January, 2009). The reflection sessions during IFOR meetings (lecture/seminar/workshop) altered the frames of the individual. The couple had made their attendees realize their culpability in sustaining injustices in society (Goss-Mayr 1998; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). Apart from teaching methods of active nonviolence, the couple imparted the philosophy of nonviolence – truth and love. This philosophy of nonviolence was the impetus for some secular people to join the nonviolent uprising in EDSA.

PARTING THOUGHTS

In making sense of the logic behind the emergence and mobilization of nonviolent anti-Marcos movements in EDSA 1986, I shed light on the contribution of IFOR through the discussion of the structural and agentic levels of analysis of EDSA 1986. At the structural level, I argued that IFOR made its presence due to the changing configurations of the interaction between the domestic and international political opportunity structures in 1983-1986. This facilitated the internationalization of anti-Marcos struggle and eventually allowed the parallel efforts to spread the principle and methods of active nonviolence among anti-Marcos movement actors. To explain the changing domestic political environment, I emphasized the effect of the slow emergence of the five dimensions of political opportunity structures during the period of 1983-1986 to the weakening of Marcos' power. At the agentic level, I further made sense of the developments in the structural level through the discussion of the impact of transnational diffusion of the active nonviolence repertoire and the process of frame alignment during the period of 1983-1986. In the paper, I posited that through the effort of IFOR to influence the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements, the lectures/seminars/workshops had created the master frame of active nonviolence and had the following effects on the people:

1. Created a mass base of potential nonviolent political actors;
2. A. motivated the potential nonviolent actors to make the anti-Marcos movements their venue for demonstrating belief in active nonviolence;
B. influenced the potential nonviolent actors to participate in numerous protests and other mass actions against the Marcos regime,
3. Helped crystallize and propagate the nonviolent option against Marcos

4. Changed the outlook on the philosophy and practical use of active nonviolence.

Having said all of these, the story of EDSA 1986 and IFOR really provided a strong case that shows the possibility of rethinking the conventional understanding on social movements and their relationship with revolutions. Through this paper, I intend to spur future discussions on the changing contours of the transnationalization of social movements. The discussions that I have made on the impact of the changing domestic and international political opportunity structures, transnational diffusion of repertoire, production and alignment of frames to social movement mobilization and outcomes aim to raise the awareness of social scientists and theorists of the changes that continue to unfold in social movements across the world. On top of that, the paper also invites scholars to the possibility of finally having transnational nonstate actors as one of the major actors in the theory revolutions. In my discussion of EDSA 1986, I showed how transnational nonstate actors may likely to increase the likelihood of success in a revolution through their ideational influence and support for the networking capabilities of revolutionary movements. In theorizing revolutions, this study also serves as a challenge to social movement and revolution scholars for the long awaited convergence (Goldstone 2001). The dearth of literature on the relationship between revolutions and social movements should continue to inspire scholars and scientist to persist in their search for theories and frameworks to further our understanding of revolutions and social movement actions. Lastly, and most importantly, this paper also aims to pique the curiosity of both local social scientists to reflect on these recent finding on the social movement mobilization in EDSA 1986. With this work, I hope, would reawaken the interest of EDSA 1986 experts to revisit their conceptualizations of EDSA 1986 and perhaps spearhead the rise of the theoretical vibrancy in the scholarship of EDSA 1986.

NOTE

- 1 Taken from my masteral thesis entitled "The Nexus between Transnational Non-State Actors and Revolutions: International Fellowship of Reconciliation and EDSA 1986."

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